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Celis 2
According to a Gallup poll conducted in 2014, “Nearly four in 10 Americans say equal
pay is the top issue facing working women in the United States today, a sentiment shared by
roughly the same proportions of men, women, and working women” (Jones 2014). As a working
woman, it is possible that you have experienced the effects of the gender pay gap in your
lifetime, or at least heard that men are paid more than women. But what does that mean, exactly?
Do men simply study more and thus make more? Do women naturally select occupations that
pay less? Do they have more responsibilities inside the home? Or does race play a role? While
there is great disagreement as to the actual cause of the gender pay gap, researchers have found
time and time again that this gap, although it has improved over time, continues to exist today.
Further, many studies have found earnings vary among different racial or ethnic groups,
with Whites earning substantially more than any other group with the exception of Asians. Day
and Newburger (2002) report that based on estimates of work-life earnings for these groups, the
racial pay gap actually widens over the lifetime. Before, the argument made was that minority
groups such as Blacks and Hispanics simply did not possess as much human capital as higher
earning Whites. However, research finds that in fact, college attendance rates among minorities
have increased (Lopez and Fry 2013, U.S. Department of Education 2016). Despite these
increased rates in college attendance, the earnings gap continues to exist.
As a country with an increasing rate of women in the workforce (Stalsburg 2016),
research findings on the pay gap should concern us more. Through my honors project, I will
explore the persistence of observed gender salary disparity despite substantial gains in
educational attainment over time by women and how race impacts their earnings.
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In the following section, I will review the interdisciplinary literature pertaining to the
gender salary disparity, specifically the roles of race and college education. Using data from the
National Survey of College Graduates of 2010 (NSCG) and the college-educated as the unit of
observation, this paper will examine racial earnings differentials after controlling for
geographical location, marital status, number of children, educational attainment, and
experience. From these results, we will not only gain a deeper understanding of the how the
aforementioned factors work together to affect the gender pay gap, but in acquiring that
knowledge, we will also be better equipped to negotiate our earnings as women in the workplace.
Research Question
Despite the fact that today, women constitute the majority of higher education graduates, (U.S.
Department of Education 2016) they still earn considerably less than their male counterparts.
Using controls for region, demographics, and human capital development, how does race help to
explain this pay gap? In other words, how does race affect salary for college educated women?
Literature Review
An extensive literature confirms the pay gap observed between men and women (Blau and Kahn
1999, Solberg 1999, Alkadry and Tower 2006, Erosa et al. 2016, Angelov et al. 2016, Kim 2015,
Janssen et al. 2016). Using a projection method and assumptions regarding the evolution of
educational attainment, Michael Shannon and Michael Kidd (2003) first estimate the future
distribution of skills and use those estimates to predict the size of the future gender wage gap in
the U.S. They find that although improvement of women’s skills—especially that of educational
attainment—will result in a continued decrease of the pay gap, the projections suggest that pay
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convergence will not only take place at a slow rate, but also that a substantial pay gap will
continue to exist in in the United States even in 2040 (Shannon and Kidd 2002).
One factor that may affect the difference in pay across groups of people may be
educational attainment. Many studies find “a college degree is key to economic opportunity,
conferring substantially higher earnings on those with credentials than those without” (Carnevale
et al. 2011). Joanne Lindley and Stephen Machin (2016) find a significant rise in the
postgraduate wage premium over time, which reflects an increased relative demand due to the
superior skills sets of these individuals and their occupational status. Carnevale et al. (2011) note
that the U.S. Census Bureau, in a 2002 study, estimated that in 1999, the average lifetime
earnings of an individual with a Bachelor’s degree was $2.7 million, a total 75 percent larger
than that of a high school graduate. According to their report, today’s numbers show similar
results: since 1999, the college education premium is 84 percent. In other words, the value of a
college education in terms of future income continues to rise. Further, Tamborini et al. (2015)
confirm in their study on education and lifetime earnings in the United States, the positive effect
of higher education on income. Additionally, Baum et al. (2013) from the College Board
Advocacy and Policy Center explain the benefits of post-secondary education on income.
According to their report, median earnings of individuals possessing a bachelor’s degree who
worked full time in 2011 were $56,500, a total $21,100 greater than the median earnings of those
who only graduated from high school. Moreover, individuals with attended college for some
time, but did not obtain a degree, still earned 14% more high school graduates working full time
and year-round. Thus, such results suggest that in analyzing earnings disparities, it might be
useful to examine the effects of educational attainment.
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When race is added to the question of whether or not educational attainment will improve
economic opportunities, the literature suggests whites and Asians are more likely to earn more
with more education. Desegregation efforts in the 1970s and 1980s may have led to greater
educational gains for black children (Pew Research Center), but does that mean that these
children now the same opportunities as white children? Using U.S. Census and Current
Population Survey data, Milner finds that while the racial differentials on occupation and
education were reduced by 1970, the proportion of the occupational gap that was explained by
educational attainment actually increased. This finding suggests efforts to reduce job
discrimination played a bigger role in explaining the gap than efforts to desegregate schools to
help increase educational attainment levels among black children (Milner 1973). More recently,
in a Pew Research Center report, researchers found the high school graduation gap between
blacks and whites has significantly decreased, with the percentage of whites in of U.S.
population age 25 and older with a high school diploma at 93 and that of blacks at 88. Asians had
a high school diploma attainment of 89% and Hispanics 67%. Similarly, they found whites are
more likely to have a college degree at 36% of U.S. population age 25 and older (holding at least
a bachelor’s degree) than blacks at 23%, although this gap was much wider. Hispanics are even
less likely to have at least a bachelor’s degree at a mere 15% of the U.S. population age 25 and
older, while Asians are the most likely at 53% (Pew Research Center 2016). Thus, while whites
are the most likely to graduate high school, Asians are the most likely to graduate college. In
terms of economic opportunities, the Pew Research Center finds that the median adjusted
household income in 2014 dollars was highest for Asians at $77,900, followed by whites at
$71,300, and blacks and Hispanics at a low $43,300; a gap which has actually widened over time
(2016). These findings suggest that while the racial gaps in terms of educational attainment have
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decreased over time, the racial earnings gap continues to exist, suggesting other factors may be
playing a role.
Much of the literature also supports the idea that human capital development has positive
effects on earnings (Willis 1986, Weiss 1995, Blundell et al. 1999, Gabriel and Schmitz 2015).
As explained by Danice Lynn Langdon and Roger Klomegah (2013), “human capital differences
are the time and investment that an individual puts into education and work force.” In the 1960s
and 1970s, different economists including Schultz (1961), Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974)
expanded on this idea of “human capital” to include “education, training, work, experience, and
even expenditure on health care” as means for increasing the productivity of workers, which is in
effect, an investment in human capital (Olson 2012). In other words, human capital theory relies
on the idea that the resources we, or others spend to help refine our knowledge and skillset is an
investment in the capital we provide as individuals to our employer. Investment in human capital
development then, helps increase our earnings.
Further, many researchers argue that human capital development signals explanations of
earnings. Andrew Weiss (1995) explores this idea in his research and finds that while human
capital development is important in explaining earnings, it also serves as an important signal to
employers. As he describes it, “better educated workers are not a random sample of workers:
they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent, are less likely to smoke, drink or use illicit
drugs, and are generally healthier (Weiss 1995). In other words, the fact that workers obtain an
education signals to employers they are already better prepared for the workplace. These are then
the individuals a firm wants to employ as by hiring them, firms may experience lower turnover
and higher productivity as opposed to hiring non-educated individuals. Thus, human capital
development serves as a signal of personality and character traits that may prove beneficial to a
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firm. Further, given that many economists argue that one of the ways in which wages are
determined is through the productivity of workers (Case and Fair 2004), then investment in
human capital can thus serve to help explain wages (Olson 2012), or more generally, earnings.
Weiss’ finding that human capital development signals explanations of earnings supports
the statistical discrimination model, as proposed by economists Edmund S. Phelps (1972) and
Kenneth Arrow (1973). As defined by England and Lewin, statistical discrimination occurs
“when decisions are made on the basis of race or sex group averages on indicators of
productivity” (1989). Rather than employers simply having a personal prejudice or distaste for a
particular group, the idea here is that discrimination takes place because employers face limited
information about job applicants. As such, it is simple to use observable characteristics that act
as “indicators” to infer or signal an individual’s relevant skills and productivity level. Such
indicators may include gender, race, and quantity of education. The employer, a profitmaximizer, will thus “…discriminate against blacks or women if he believes them to be less
qualified, reliable, long-term, etc. on average than whites and men, respectively, and if the cost
of gaining information about the individual applicants is excessive,” for example (1972). Phelps
explains that the employer’s belief that an individual from group A is preferable to one from
group B, for example, may stem from previous statistical exposure to the two groups, where
most of the time, individuals from group A are hired over those from group B or are hired in
more favorable terms. Alternatively, the employer’s belief may stem from sociological beliefs
about particular groups, one example being the belief that blacks and women simply grow up
more disadvantaged because of racial hostility and/or prejudice they experience in society
(Phelps 1972). Supposing that the group average for blacks is in fact lower than that of whites in
terms of productivity, Arrow argues that because the cause of such a statistic is unobservable, 1
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“then the experience of employers over time will cause them to use the observable characteristic,
race, as a surrogate for the unobservable characteristics which in fact cause the productivity
differences” (1998). Thus, similar to Phelps, Arrow believes that experience with particular
groups helps shape employers’ opinions and beliefs about those groups, and leads them to make
decisions based on that experience. Nonetheless, the result is that individuals from non-preferred
groups undergo discrimination. Further, discrimination in this way can be self-reinforcing in that
when individuals of the non-preferred group realize that they are not preferred and are
discriminated against, they will not want to participate in the market and/or will not choose to
invest in human capital because they believe it will not make a difference in terms of being hired
(Arrow 1998). As such, it is possible that the once observed characteristics by employers of the
non-preferred group become reality rather remain a mere observation.
Another important aspect in terms of explaining the pay gap then, is racial discrimination.
One very popular sociological theory of discrimination is known as the social identity theory.
Fathered by Tajfel and Turner, this theory recognizes that humans long for a sense of belonging,
defining our social identity as our sense of who we are based on the social group(s) of which we
are members (1979). The theory posits that members of a group are “motivated to protect their
self-esteem and achieve a positive and distinct social identity” (Al Ramiah et al. 2010). This
desire to protect one’s group identity may lead to discrimination as we are filled with pride for
our group and consequently, we may attempt to minimize any group to which we do not belong
or, alternatively, we may give preferential treatment to those with whom we share group
membership. This desire results in an “us versus them” mentality, where we seek to raise the
status of our group and minimize that of other groups (Al Ramiah et al. 2010). In terms of
employer discrimination then, this theory might manifest if, for example, a male employer feels
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strongly about his social identity as a man and as such, chooses to hire a male employee over a
female or a black individual simply because they share a group identity (both the employer and
the employee are male). The result is discrimination toward the out group—in this case, the
black and female individuals. Using data from the MultiCity Study of Urban Inequality and the
Multi-City Telephone Employer Survey, Julie A. Kmec (2002) studies this effect. She finds the
data support the idea of race-based devaluation. In fact, employers pay whites and minorities in
mostly black or Latino jobs smaller wages and provide them with fewer benefits than their peers
in mostly white jobs, net of controls. Further, she finds that employers hire based on race and/or
gender traits they share with applicants (Kmec 2002). In other words, white employers hire more
white employees because they share the same race, and male employers hire more male
employees because they share the same gender—a finding that supports the social identity theory
on discrimination. In other words, employers have certain preferences for groups that affect the
way in which they hire and that may result in negative effects in terms of earnings if that worker
is in the non-preferred group.
Kmec’s findings may also be explained in part by Gary Becker’s Taste Discrimination
Model, an economic theory that depicts discrimination as a personal prejudice—or taste—against
associating with a particular group of individuals. Having a “taste for discrimination” implies
that the discriminator is willing to pay a price to discriminate against a particular group (England
and Lewin 1989). According to the model, there are three sources of discrimination: the
employer, the employee (coworker), and the customer, however, for the purposes of this paper,
we will focus on the employer. In maximizing his utility, an employer may choose to forgo
profits in order to avoid associating himself with groups for which he has distaste. I will provide
an example to better explain the theory. Suppose an employer prefers to associate himself with
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neither women nor minorities and instead has a preference, or taste, for hiring white men.
Suppose further, for the purposes of explaining the model, these women and minorities are just
as productive as white men. Given the employer’s preference for hiring white men and the
choice between the three groups, he will act as if the non-preferred groups (in this case women
and minorities) are less productive than the preferred group (white men), despite equal
productivity between the three groups. Thus, the employer’s devaluation of the productivity of
the non-preferred groups is strictly subjective and is therefore a demonstration of personal
prejudice (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012).
In order to affect earnings, these preferences or tastes for particular groups must influence
employers’ actions in hiring. In order to affect earnings on a larger scale then, these preferences
or tastes for particular groups must apply on a large scale—for the purposes of my paper, this
means many firms must have distastes for minorities and women and thus discrimination takes
place. Ultimately, the result is that the employer pays for his distaste of the non-preferred group,
a cost that is denoted by the negative discrimination coefficient “d,” which measures the strength
of his distaste. The cost to him of employing an individual from a non-preferred group is thus
𝑤𝑛𝑝 + 𝑑, where w is wage and the subscript “np” stands for the non-preferred group and “d” is a
negative number. Further, the discriminating employer ends up hiring the individual from the
non-preferred group at a lower wage than that of the preferred group, despite having equal
productivity, effectively discriminating against the non-preferred individual. (Borjas 2016). This
result is depicted in the equation 𝑤𝑛𝑝 = 𝑤𝑝 − 𝑑 > 𝑤𝑝 , where the subscript “p” stands for the
preferred group. Keeping in mind that the discrimination coefficient is negative, given this
example then, the outcome is that wage of the preferred white male is higher than those of the
non-preferred minorities and women. As England and Lewin explain, an employer with a
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distaste for women, for example, is “unwilling to hire [women] unless they offer themselves at a
wage far enough below the wage paid white [males] to completely offset the disutility she or he
experiences by employing [women]” (1989). Consequently, the wage gap widens with the
discriminatory preferences of employers between the preferred group and the non-preferred
group(s). 2
To gain a better understanding of why discrimination occurs, we can also examine other
socio-psychological views on discrimination. It is important to note that discrimination from a
sociological standpoint deviates a little from the economics definition. As defined by Correll et
al., discrimination is “behaviour directed towards category members that is consequential for
their outcomes and that is directed towards them not because of any particular deservingness or
reciprocity, but simply because they happen to be members” (2010). Another commonly cited
theory of discrimination in the sociological world is aversive racism. The idea here is that rather
than professing their racism and/or prejudices openly, individuals do so in a quiet manner,
typically by choosing to not interact with those individuals towards which they feel prejudiced.
Often times, these individuals actually profess egalitarian values in front of others, despite inner
prejudice toward particular groups (Al Ramiah et al. 2010). As Al Ramiah et al. explain, “people
generally will not discriminate in situations in which right and wrong is clearly defined;
discrimination would be obvious to others and to oneself, and aversive racists do not want to
appear or be discriminatory” (2010). The end result, nonetheless, is discrimination. In terms of
employer discrimination, this theory would suggest that while employers may seem to uphold
egalitarian values on the outside—a good example might be a company that state it is an “equal
opportunity employer”—the reality is that he does feel prejudiced against some groups, but
because he is racist averse, will tend to be more discreet about it. Perhaps he will choose not to
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hire an individual from a group he feels prejudiced towards, but rather than stating that it is a
matter of race, for example, will say that he does not possess the skills and/or experience
required for the job—a reason that tends to be more accepted as it is not typically associated with
discrimination.
Ultimately then, economics tells us that while those who are discriminated against suffer
lower earnings than their marginal productivity of labor, employers also suffer the consequence
their discrimination by paying a discrimination coefficient, thus lowering their profits. This
theory then suggests firms that do not discriminate will fare better in terms of profitability.
Sociology, on the other hand, works with economic theories of discrimination to help us to
understand why employers might discriminate against their employees, thus providing a better
understanding of how earnings might be affected by gender and race.
Theory
Based on the literature review and the various theories of discrimination, race should play a role
in the gender pay gap. The logic here is that employers discriminate whether intentionally or
unintentionally by basing decisions involving their employees on tastes and/or personal
prejudices towards particular groups, lack of information, or their strong connection to their own
group identity. For the purposes of this project, discrimination will be defined as a minority
group of individuals being treated in a less favorable manner—based on an observable
characteristic—than the majority group, despite both groups having equal levels of productivity.
Employers may have a particular taste for a certain group, or distaste based on preconceived
notions about that group. Because there is no absolute way to measure productivity, in many
cases he or she may rely on “indicators” to infer about an applicant’s relevant skills and work
ethic. He or she may prefer a particular group because he or she shares a social identity with that
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group and feels a strong connection with that individual, thus choosing to hire him or her over an
individual with whom he or she does not share a social identity. Regardless of the reasoning and
intention or lack of intention, the result is discrimination against some group. Generally
speaking, the literature suggests there are three groups who “win” in terms of highest earnings.
Those three groups are males, whites, and Asians. These findings imply that women are
absolutely at a disadvantage because of their gender, as are most minorities, including blacks and
Hispanics. While educational attainment and investment in human capital development may help
to narrow this gender and racial earnings disparity, the literature suggests the disparity continues
to exist.
Hypotheses
Given this theory and the previous literature, one would expect to see a few different results.
First, one would expect the effects of the variables encompassing human capital are positive. In
other words, the greater the levels of degree attainment, work experience (years since highest
attained degree), and firm specific skills (current job tenure), the larger the salary of the
individual, as the literature states. Further, despite increasing levels of investment in human
capital development, one would expect that women continue to earn less than men. Additionally,
one would expect that race plays an important role in the determining of salaries. As the
literature tells us, whites and Asians tend to earn more than other minorities despite increasing
levels of educational attainment among those minorities, suggesting discrimination may be
occurring in the workplace. Thus, one would expect that regardless of gender, whites and Asians
will earn more, while blacks and Hispanics will earn less.
H1: An increase in human capital development should result in a larger salary.
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H2: Women should have lower salaries than their male colleagues.
H3: Asians should have similar comparable salaries to their white colleagues.
H4: Blacks and Hispanics should have lower salaries than their white and Asian
colleagues.
Method for Research
The National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) is a biennial survey sponsored by the
National Science Foundation that provides data on different characteristics of college graduates
under the age of 76 living in the United States. The 2010 NSCG sampled approximately 135,000
random individuals who had obtained at least an associate’s degree at the time of taking the
survey. For the purposes of this study, I will include only full-time individuals who have all the
data for the analysis. The sample size then becomes 55,421.3 Using this data, I will estimate a
series of OLS regressions on individual and job-related characteristics to determine the role of
race in the persistence of the gender pay gap. Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations
of the variables.
In addition to controlling for gender, where male is the omitted variable, the final dataset
used for this analysis includes controls for different factors that affect salaries including
geographical location (where New England is the omitted variable), social demographics, human
capital development, and occupation. Human capital development is controlled for through
variables representing the individual education and employment circumstances of those
surveyed. Variables representing the highest degree obtained by an individual (i.e. master’s,
PhD, or professional degree) capture the educational effect, where a bachelor’s degree is the
omitted category. In terms of employment, variables include years since attainment of highest
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degree and tenure with current employer. The occupation controls include fifteen different
occupational categories, where a kindergarten through 12 th grade teaching job is the omitted
category. The notes under part I of the Appendix provide a detailed description of each
occupation category used in this analysis.
Using this data, I will use the traditional semi-log functional form for salary regression to
determine their effects on women’s salaries by race. First, I will run an initial regression with
only geographical location (region) as a control. I will then run a second regression controlling
for social demographics (marital status and number of children).4 The third regression will
control for human capital (degree attainment, work experience, and firm specific skills—current
job tenure) while the fourth regression will control for occupation. Additionally, I will run a final
regression to check for possible interactive effects with gender. The full regression equation is
𝑗

written as: ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙 ) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑘 + 𝛽𝑗 ∑𝑖=1 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑗 +
𝑛
𝛽𝑙 ∑𝑙𝑖=1 ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽𝑚 ∑𝑚
𝑖=𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚 + 𝛽𝑛 ∑𝑖=𝑛 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑛 + 𝑢𝑖 , with interactions

between some of these variables and gender in a final model. Ultimately, by setting up the
regressions in this manner, we will be able to see how each set of controls helps to further
explain discrepancies in earnings by gender and race.
One of the assumptions of the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) known as
“homoskedasticity” is that the variance of the error terms is constant for each observation
(Woolridge 2012). Because the error variance measures model uncertainty, this assumption
implies that the model uncertainty is same for all observations. When this assumption fails, then
the model is likely to have a heteroskedasticity problem. To ensure that the error terms are
constant for each observation, I will test for heteroskedasticity in my models using the BreuschPagan and White tests. From these tests, I will be able to conclude whether a heteroskedasticity
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problem is present and will proceed to correct it. One of the commonly used methods to correct
for heteroskedasticity is through the use of robust standard errors. This correction involves
producing consistent estimators of the standard errors (Woolridge 2012). The idea here is to
create constant variance across observations and thus arrive at homoskedasticity in order to
appropriately conduct t and F tests.
Finally, in conducting research, it is always important to recognize limitations. For the
purposes of my honors project, it is important to recognize that, as Olson (2013) explains, human
capital theory, although useful in understanding the gender pay gap, does not provide measures
that are “totally a matter of free choice unaffected by social norms.” In other words, there are
other factors beyond economics that may influence earnings; there may be social factors
involved of which we are unaware. While this study will look at some important factors that play
a role in earnings such as occupation, region, human capital development and social
demographics such as marital status and number of children, it is not all encompassing.
Results
This study finds that controlling for region explains about 7.1 percent of the variation in salary
for the college-educated. Table 2 reports the log-linear salary regressions. Column 2 provides the
basic regression with controls for the regions of New England, Atlantic, Central, Mountain, and
Pacific, where New England is the omitted variable. Given this these controls, females earn an
average salary of 38.2 percent less than males, supporting my second hypothesis that women
should earn less than males. Additionally, blacks earn an average salary of 7.0 percent and
Hispanics 12.2 percent less than whites, supporting my fourth hypothesis that blacks and
Hispanics earn less than their white counterparts. In terms of Asians, controlling for region, the
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result is that Asians earn an average salary 4.6 percent larger than whites, supporting my third
hypothesis that Asians and whites have similar salaries, although 4.6% is larger than I imagined.
Further, controlling for the social demographics of marital status and number of kids only
adds about 1.5 percent explanatory power to the estimation of these college educated individuals’
salaries, while the addition of human capital development controls almost doubles its
explanatory power at 15.9 percent. As can be seen in the second column of Table 2, adding
marital status and number of kids reduces the female coefficient by only two percentage points.
These controls do cut the black coefficient by about 3 percentage points to 4.6, but does very
little to the coefficients on Asian and Hispanic. As can be seen in the third column of Table 2,
when adding human capital development controls, the coefficient on female is reduced to 35.4
percent while the coefficient on Asian increases by about one percent at 5.5 and the coefficient
on Hispanic decreases to 7 percent. These results suggest that investment in human capital
development may be a worthwhile endeavor, especially for Hispanics, whose average salary rises
by about five percent when accounting for human capital development. Similarly, when
controlling only for only marital status, number of kids, and region, the result is an increase in
the average salary for blacks by about 3 percent. Adding controls for human capital development
to the model reduces the coefficient on black decreases to a mere 0.8 percent, although the
coefficient is not statistically significant, suggesting white and black salaries are not different
once human capital is included in the model. Further, these results suggest that Hispanic and
black minorities can gain from obtaining higher levels of education. They reflect the results
Cheeseman Day and Newburger, who found that both black and Hispanic work-life earnings
increase with higher educational attainment although at a higher rate for blacks than for
Hispanics using data from the U.S. Census (2002). Because the coefficients on race are

Celis 18
statistically significant with the exception of the coefficient on black in the third model, these
results suggest that human capital definitely affects the earning potentials of individuals by race.
Controlling for occupation adds even greater explanatory power to the estimation of
salaries for these college-educated individuals at 27.4 percent. Most of the coefficients on the
occupational categories are statistically significant, suggesting that occupation plays a major role
in the earnings of individuals by race and gender. Further, in conducting a restricted F-test to
determine if occupation jointly matters to the model, the result is that occupation should be
included, as it adds to the model. Of all the occupations, the only category not statistically
significant is that of social occupations.5 Some of the best paid individuals are those in
engineering, management and business, and the hard sciences with average earnings greater than
those of k-12 teachers by 57.8, 50.6, and 42.8 percent, respectively.
Finally, the interactions model as can be seen in column 5 of Table 2, tests for gender
differences on any variables interacted with female. Incorporating these interactions with all
controls explains about 28.08 percent of the salary discrepancy between men and women. Given
the literature review and theory which tells us that men earn more than women, one should
expect that the coefficient on the salary of men be positive. The results support this information.
On average, when all other variables equal zero, the predicted value of natural log of salary for
white men is a positive 10.272. In dollar terms, this means that on average, all other variables set
equal to zero, white men earn a salary of about $25,058.13.6 This result further supports the
literature and media reporting white men are the top earners. As suggested by the literature,
Asian men earn comparable salaries to white men, with an average only 2.3 percent lower than
white men. Hispanic men follow with an average salary 7.3 percent lower than that of white men
with black men following closely behind at 8.7 percent.
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Conversely, one would expect that the coefficients on the earnings of women be negative.
As expected, Asian women earn an average salary 26.5 percent lower than white men—a
differential comparable to that of white women. Interestingly, white women fall behind Hispanic
women—although only slightly—earning a lower average salary of 33.3 percent compared to the
Hispanic woman’s 32.3 percent when compared to white men. More importantly, the data show
that black women earn an average salary that is 22.4 percent lower than white males, making
them the top female earners, even greater than Asian and white women (when compared to white
men). This finding therefore suggests that black women have the most to gain from further
educational attainment, a result supporting the findings of others that educated black women are
surpassing educated white women in terms of earnings (“It’s the Strong Academic Performance”
2001).
In interacting with gender, we see some interesting results for some of the variables. In
terms of kids, men can have up to four children before return begins to decline, as can be seen in
Figure 1. In contrast, women face a declining return to children after the first one. In other
words, men gain in terms of salary by having more children (up to four) while women lose by
having even just one. Regarding degree attainment, we can see in Figures 2, 3, and 4 that
although men earn more, women can narrow the gap by pursuing a Master’s degree, and even
further by pursing a PhD or a professional degree such as a JD (law) and a MD (medicine). In
interacting gender with current job tenure, we see that the returns to men are rising with another
year of tenure until reaching their peak at 41 years of tenure, where returns begin to decline.
Similarly, women face increasing returns with each additional year of tenure, however, their
peak is at 26 years. These results are illustrated in Figure 5.
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To ensure that the error terms were constant for each observation, I tested for
heteroskedasticity. The results for the two tests I used, the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests,
can be seen Table 4. Using both of these tests, I was able to reject the null and conclude that I
had a heteroskedasticity problem. In order to correct for it, I used robust standard errors, which
are commonly used to correct for heteroskedasticity (Woolridge 2012).
Conclusion
This paper examines some of the different factors that affect salary differentials by race and
gender. By estimating a series of OLS regressions through levels of controls, we are able to see
how different controls including geographic location, social demographics, human capital
development and occupation work together to explain these differences in pay. On their own,
marital status and number of kids (social demographic controls) do very little to explain
discrepancies in pay by race and gender. Men are paid more than women across all races and
white men are the top earners. As expected, Asians are near the top in terms of salary for both
genders with Hispanics falling behind. The inclusion of human capital development controls
almost doubles the explanatory power of the model. This finding suggests that my hypothesis
that an increase in human capital development should result in a higher salary is correct, thus
making it a worthwhile investment for all individuals—regardless of gender or race. After
controlling for occupation—which adds significant explanatory power to the model—and
interacting race, I find that white women make an average wage 33.3 percent lower than white
men, while that same differential is only 22.4 percent for black women. This finding suggests
that black women have the most to gain from investing in their human capital development. As
such, black women should definitely pursue higher levels of educational attainment as well as
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experience in the workplace. In this way, they can continue to work towards narrowing the gap
between men and women as well as across races.
Given more time and unlimited resources, I would definitely analyze a few different
aspects in ascertaining exactly what factors affect these salary differentials. In terms of the
impact on women, I would like to see if there are any important interactions between gender and
working in a particular occupation. News articles often cite women choosing to work in
occupations that pay less as one of the reasons for the gender pay gap. It would thus be
interesting to test whether this statement true, especially in regards to college-educated
individuals like me. Further, I would like to investigate how fringe benefits—benefits that
supplement an individual’s salary such as a company car, health insurance, and/or vacation
pay—impact the gender and racial pay gap. According to a study conducted by Solberg and
Laughlin that includes a comprehensive measure of compensation for men and women, the
inclusion of fringe benefits leads to a reduction in the gap from 12.6 to 3.6 percent (1995). It
would be interesting to see how this additional compensation would factor in for collegeeducated individuals in explaining the differences in salaries across gender and race. Finally, I
would also perform a Oaxaca decomposition, which decomposes outcome variables into
explained and unexplained variation (Oaxaca 1973). In the case of salary, examples of explained
variation could include level of educational attainment and current job tenure, unexplained
variation may include discrimination. In this way, one could more accurately determine the
nature of the gender and racial salary differentials. As working women, the hope is that this
research and any further research conducted on gender and racial salary differentials serve to
better inform us on our opportunities or lack thereof as we walk into the workforce and fight for
what is not only fair, but also just—equality.
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Appendix
I.

Information on Categories of Occupations:












Scientists (Hard Science): Computer Science, Mathematics, Biology, Physical Science
Engineers: All Engineers.
Doctors and Lawyers: MDs, Attorneys, Judges.
All Other Health Occupations: Nurses, Pharmacists, Dieticians, Health Technicians,
All other Health Occupations.
Social Scientists: Economists, Political Scientists, Psychologists, Sociologists,
Anthropologists.
Social Services: All other social scientists, Social Workers, Counselors.
K-12 Teachers: All teachers in K-12 system.
University Professors: All individual teaching at the university level.
Management and Business Professionals: Top and Mid-Managers in public, private,
nonprofit industries, Accountants and Auditors, Personnel and Training Specialists, Sales
in insurance, securities, commodities, retail.
Creative/History: Artists, Editors, Entertainers, Public Relations, Historians, Librarians,
Archivists, and Curators.
Technical: Technicians in all industries, Architects, Actuaries, Drafting Technicians,
Surveyors, Computer Programmers.

Celis 23

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample
Mean
Std. Dev.
Ln(salary)
1 if black=1
Female =1
1 if black=1 x
female=1
1 if Hispanic =1
1 if Hispanic=1 x
female=1
1 if Asian=1
1 if Asian=1 x
female=1
Number of kids
Number of kids2
Female=1 x total
number of kids
Female=1 x total
number of kids2
Highest Degree is MA
Highest degree=MA=1
x female=1
Highest Degree is PhD
Highest degree=PhD=1
x female=1
Highest Degree is
Professional
Highest
degree=Professional
=1 x female=1
Years since Highest
Degree
Years since Highest
Degree2
Current Job Tenure
Current Job Tenure2
Female=1 x current job
tenure
Female=1 x current job
tenure2
Region
2

Male
Mean Std. Dev.

Female
Mean Std. Dev.

11.00136
0.0953096
0.4272732
0.052805

0.759799
0.293645
0.494687
0.223646

11.16623 0.6718709
0.0742146 0.2621239
1
0
0.0742146 0.2621239

10.78035
0.123586
1
0.123586

0.8128795
0.3291156
0
0.3291156

0.1045962
0.0493112

0.306035
0.216519

0.0965295 0.2953207
0.0965295 0.2953207

0.1154091
0.1154091

0.3195217
0.3195217

0.1670136
0.0666353

0.372991
0.249392

0.1752639
0.1752639

0.3801987
0.3801987

0.1559548
0.1559548

0.3628201
0.3628201

0.7996597
1.793306
0.308376

1.074184
3.673288
0.753123

0.8577976
1.974809
0.8577976

1.113118
3.902852
1.113118

0.7217303
1.550015
0.7217303

1.014477
3.325502
1.014477

0.6622798

2.305

1.974809

3.902852

1.550015

3.325502

0.3433319
0.1621622

0.474825
0.368603

0.3163285 0.4650501
0.3163285 0.4650501

0.379528
0.379528

0.4852798
0.4852798

0.0663275
0.0253435

0.248856
0.157168

0.0715595
0.0715595

0.2577612
0.2577612

0.0593145
0.0593145

0.2362174
0.2362174

0.0599012

0.237306

0.0601176 0.2377083

0.0596111

0.2367699

0.0254702

0.15755

0.0601176 0.2377083

0.0596111

0.2367699

16.91628

11.14717

18.08367

11.2805

15.35148

10.76944

410.4176

451.0708

454.2647

467.601

351.6438

420.816

8.304375
132.8644
3.261527

7.993929
248.3572
6.136226

8.804981
147.6694
8.804981

8.3752
267.5627
8.3752

7.633352
113.0194
7.633352

7.399569
218.4367
7.399569

48.29015

153.3379

147.6694

267.5627

113.0194

218.4367

0.335566

0.472192

0.32265 0.4674975

0.3528789

0.4778756
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3
4
5
Married
Scientist
Engineer
Doctor
Health Job
Technical Job
Social Job
University Professor
Management/Business
Creative Job
Secretary
Service
Social Scientist
Manual Labor
Law

0.3430242
0.0639018
0.1950725
0.7519053
0.1732409
0.2248873
0.0201481
0.0659112
0.153835
0.0299415
0.0562083
0.2634999
0.0139208
0.0291088
0.0257055
0.0239677
0.023316
0.0277511

0.474724
0.24458
0.39626
0.431911
0.378459
0.417512
0.140508
0.248129
0.360794
0.170428
0.230326
0.440535
0.117164
0.168113
0.158257
0.15295
0.150907
0.16426

0.3529932
0.0677982
0.1943865
0.7998925
0.1985903
0.2407232
0.0205765
0.0218724
0.1451419
0.0152665
0.0490549
0.2887667
0.0093558
0.0128643
0.0234212
0.0170049
0.0294582
0.0270561

0.4779082
0.2514033
0.3957339
0.4000869
0.3989451
0.4275293
0.141964
0.1462693
0.3522494
0.1226127
0.2159862
0.4531964
0.0962736
0.1126907
0.1512395
0.1292913
0.1690898
0.1622494

0.3296615
0.058679
0.195992
0.6875821
0.139262
0.2036606
0.0195738
0.1249417
0.1654874
0.0496123
0.0657967
0.2296318
0.0200398
0.0508834
0.0287675
0.0333009
0.0150828
0.0286828

0.4701002
0.2350279
0.3969708
0.463489
0.346227
0.402728
0.1385333
0.3306599
0.3716278
0.2171473
0.2479317
0.420605
0.1401394
0.2197642
0.167156
0.1794248
0.1218851
0.166917
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Table 2: Regressions
(1)
Basic
Regression

(2)
Married
and Kids

(3)
Married, Kids, &
Human Capital

-0.382***
(0.007)
-0.070***
(0.011)
0.046***
(0.009)
-0.122***
(0.011)

-0.363***
(0.007)
-0.041***
(0.011)
0.040***
(0.009)
-0.116***
(0.011)
0.145***
(0.008)
0.085***
(0.007)
-0.014***
(0.002)

Control for Region

Yes

Control for Occupation

No

Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Married
Total Number of Kids
Total Number of Kids 2

(5)
Interactions

Yes

-0.354***
(0.006)
-0.008
(0.011)
0.055***
(0.008)
-0.070***
(0.010)
0.085***
(0.008)
0.045***
(0.006)
-0.009***
(0.002)
0.174***
(0.007)
0.320***
(0.012)
0.451***
(0.013)
0.040***
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.022***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
Yes

(4)
Married, Kids,
Human
Capital, and
Occupation
-0.236***
(0.006)
0.015
(0.010)
0.011
(0.008)
-0.037***
(0.010)
0.062***
(0.007)
0.036***
(0.006)
-0.007***
(0.002)
0.195***
(0.006)
0.461***
(0.012)
0.362***
(0.022)
0.035***
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.025***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Highest Degree is MA
Highest Degree is PhD
Highest Degree is Professional
Years since Highest Degree
Years since Highest Degree2
Current Job Tenure
Current Job Tenure2

1 if black=1 x female=1
1 if Hispanic=1 X female=1
1 if Asian=1 X female=1
Female=1 x total number of
kids
Female=1 x total number of

kids2

-0.333***
(0.016)
-0.087***
(0.013)
-0.023**
(0.009)
-0.071***
(0.012)
0.065***
(0.007)
0.090***
(0.007)
-0.013***
(0.002)
0.155***
(0.007)
0.397***
(0.013)
0.318***
(0.023)
0.035***
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.017***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
Yes

0.195***
(0.019)
0.081***
(0.019)
0.091***
(0.016)
-0.120***
(0.013)
0.010*
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(0.004)
0.092***

Highest degree=MA=1 x
female=1

(0.013)
0.162***

Highest degree=PhD=1 x
female=1

(0.022)
0.110***

Highest degree=Professional=1
x female=1

(0.025)
0.017***
(0.002)
-0.000***

Female=1 x current job tenure
Female=1 x current job

tenure2
11.216***
(0.013)
0.071
55241.000
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Constant
r2
N

11.053***
(0.014)
0.085
55241.000

10.553***
(0.016)
0.159
55241.000

10.226***
(0.018)
0.274
55241.000

(0.000)
10.272***
(0.019)
0.281
55241.000

Data Source: National Survey of College Graduates, 2010
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
All models control for region while models (4) and (5) control for occupation.
Chi2 was 3675.80.

Table 3: Differentials by Race and Gender
White Male
White Female
Black Male
Black Female
Hispanic Male
Hispanic Female
Asian Male
Asian Female

White Female
-0.333
N/A
0.246
-0.108
-0.262
-0.010
-0.310
-0.068

Black Female
-0.224
0.108
-0.139
N/A
-0.154
0.098
-0.202
0.040

Hispanic Female
-0.323
0.010
-0.236
-0.098
-0.252
N/A
-0.300
-0.058

Asian Female
-0.265
0.068
-0.178
-0.040
-0.194
0.058
-0.242
N/A

Note: Using the coefficients, I estimated the differentials by race and gender, holding all other variables constant.

Table 4: Testing for Heteroskedasticity
Test
Breusch-Pagan
White

Chi-Square Statistic
3647.17
2879.90

P-value
0.000
0.000

Figure 1
Predicted ln(Salary) by Kids

10

10.5

11

11.5

with 95% Confidence Intervals

9.5

Predicted ln(Salary)
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0
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3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Number of Kids
female=0

female=1

10

11

12

Figure 2
Predicted ln(Salary) by Degree
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Figure 3
Predicted ln(Salary) by Degree
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0

1

PhD
female=0

female=1

Figure 4
Predicted ln(Salary) by Degree
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1

Professional Degree
female=0
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Figure 5
Predicted ln(Salary) by Tenure
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1

6

11

16

21

26

31

36

Current Job Tenure
female=0

female=1

41

46
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Endnotes
1

Arrow suggests some of the causes of this difference in productivity may include quality of
education or cultural differences; however, the cause itself is unobservable.
2

Here μ is normally distributed with a mean equal to zero.

3

Once all individuals not relevant to this analysis are removed, those with an associate’s degree
disappear well.
4

Squared terms for time-related variables (years since highest degree and current job tenure) are
included to capture the nonlinear relationship of experience to salary.
5

6

Details of the occupational coefficients are available from the author on request.

This salary (in dollar terms) is found by taking the antilog of the coefficient on the constant. In
this case, I took the antilog of this coefficient to obtain a rough estimate in dollar terms to make
it easier for the reader to understand the result.
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